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In May 1997, the Legal Studies Department of the Wharton
School organized a conference that brought together government
officials, lawyers, ethics specialists, economists, and others
concerned with the problems of law and ethics in emerging
economies. The purpose of this conference was to assess how
legal and ethical dilemmas overlap in emerging economies and
where the integration of legal and ethical approaches could be
fruitful. Selected conference papers presented here wrestle with
some of the major unresolved controversies on the international
economic scene. These include the following questions: In the
transition from command to market economies, what role should
the various players accord to ethics, as opposed to law? To what
laws should international businesses operating in emerging
economies look - local laws, laws in force in their home
countries, or international law? What are the merits or drawbacks
of upholding universal standards, as opposed to recognizing
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divergence in cultural and legal traditions?
In Africa, Asia, the former Eastern Bloc, and Latin America,
countries are scuttling the theory that state-controlled economies
provide the best engines for achieving rapid development.
Simultaneously, they are shifting to market models, in whole or
in substantial part, and treating the law as an instrument for
effectuating this shift. The development prospects of many
countries may be seriously compromised where their schemes for
managing the multifarious legal dimensions of difficult transitions
prove deficient. They face urgent ieeds to accomplish difficult
tasks, including the following: revising laws to fit rules of
international institutions such as the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), devising suitable corporate laws, dealing with the
delicate problems of moving from state ownership to a regime of
private ownership, establishing capital markets and a regime of
protection for intellectual property, readjusting subsidies and
social welfare policies, and also finding mechanisms to curb
criminality and exploitative practices. As yawning gaps widen
between the haves and the have-nots, strains on the social fabric
may lead to destabilizing crises. Realistically, capital importing
countries cannot expect to erect perfect frameworks overnight for
comprehensive regulation of all aspects of their economies, but
they should have ways to assign priorities and avoid dangerous
pitfalls.
There has never been a situation where so many countries
have tried simultaneously to engineer rapid economic break-
throughs. There is no settled formula for what a country should
do to effect a smooth transition to a market economy, no
consensus on the legal principles that would maximize the chances
of successfully balancing economic and social changes. Having
few real precedents to follow, planners and legislators may be
obliged to resort to best guesses. Perhaps it might seem that the
quickest route to economic success would be to copy a fabulously
successful pioneer, such as Singapore. Copying every step that
Singapore took, however, will only make sense for a country that
is essentially similar to Singapore as it was when its surge began.
It is difficult to imagine that Bolivia, Ukraine, Vietnam, or Zaire
could all manage to develop optimally while ignoring local
specificities and the gaps separating their situations from Singa-
pore's.
Another critical point is how to regulate incoming foreign
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direct investment. Since private foreign investment has emerged
in the 1990s as the most important source of development capital
and expertise, it is vital for emerging economies to set up, at the
earliest possible stage, a framework that will attract foreign
businesses and both enable them to prosper and ensure that they
are regulated in ways that will lead to sound contributions to local
developmental goals. Balancing the desire to bring in foreign
capital and to direct investment to the benefit of locals and the
local economy has never proved easy, even for countries with
greater experience with open markets.
Emerging economies that are struggling to effectuate these
challenging transitions receive much "expert" advice from
international institutions, Western economists and financiers, and
professional consultants. They have reason, however, to mistrust
this advice and to question whether or not its social and ethical
underpinnings are sound. Outside consultants may present
excessively rigid prescriptions and may fail to give sufficient
weight to the distinctive problems of individual countries.
Moreover, experts can become addicted to abstractions, leading
them to insist on certain formulas with indifference to the actual
social costs and human suffering these entail. Planners in
emerging economies will often have reason to conclude that
outside advice shows insensitivity to the consequences of charging
ahead with reforms that cast the harshest burdens of adjustment
on the most vulnerable segments of the population. Hence, the
blueprints offered by foreign advisors may be suspect on both
economic and ethical grounds.
International businesses also face troubling dilemmas in
emerging economies - dilemmas not readily acknowledged in past
decades. Today, it is appreciated that the disparity between the
careful regulation of business in capital-exporting countries and
frequently lax regulation in capital-importing countries is
problematic, and that the proverbial "rush to the basement" by
First World business buccaneers involves irresponsible plundering.
Recognizing, however, that there may be ethical problems when
companies engage in conduct abroad that would be strongly
sanctioned in their home countries does not answer the question
as to where they should look for guidance when operating abroad.
When operating at home, U.S. businesses, like other businesses
originating in capital exporting countries, routinely turn to
lawyers to determine if a proposed course of conduct is legal. In
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most cases, the reassurance that the proposed course of conduct is
perfectly legal will end the inquiry. In the highly regulated
environments in which businesses operate in First World coun-
tries, the maze of legal regulations will often leave little room for
discretion in deciding how to conduct business operations. If
tempted to engage in conduct that, although technically legal,
might cause harm to other interests such as the environment or
the public welfare, businesses may feel inhibited by potential
exposure to private lawsuits or damaging publicity. Naturally,
people acculturated in such business environments might rely on
the comforting assumption that if they are not doing anything
illegal and are not operating in a way that could result in lawsuits
or condemnation in the media, they will, in the normal case, be
acting properly and according to defensible ethical standards.
What standards, however, are to govern these same businesses
from highly regulated environments in the First World when they
venture into one of today's emerging economies? What if they
are trying to do business in countries such as China, Peru, Egypt,
Nigeria, or Russia? There, companies may be able to reap
windfall profits from low costs and lack of legal constraints on
their activities. In some settings, foreign investors may be advised
to disregard completely a formal legal system that in no way
embodies the actual rules of the game. Old hands may urge them
to adapt to what are supposedly local cultural norms and to
follow an operational code completely incompatible with what is
regarded as good business practice in their home markets. For
example, they may be advised that local statutes criminalizing
bribery are never enforced or may even learn that substantial
bribes to local officials are essential to close all business deals. A
muzzled press, an inaccessible or biased court system, and a
corrupt infrastructure may mean that foreign businesses are able
to make any deal acceptable to those in power, regardless of
injury to the environment, society, or the development prospects
of the country involved.
In many situations, a business from a capital-exporting country
such as the United States, disciplined to act like a good corporate
citizen at home, can find itself trying to conduct business in a
setting of virtual lawlessness when operating overseas. Investors
have to confront unintelligible or unpredictably fluctuating legal
regulations, inadequate or unreliable protection for private
property, bizarre and chaotic regimes of taxation and exchange
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controls, and official rapaciousness. What should international
businesses do if they decide to proceed with investments in
emerging economies that entail venturing into such legal and
ethical vacuums? Should they accept the advice, which they will
frequently receive, that respect for sovereignty and local culture
require that they adjust their standards downwards? Should they
conclude that consistency is a virtue and refer back to the familiar
legal standards in force in their home markets, attempting to
apply these in a setting where they are unsupported by the local
legal system? Should they forget about legal regulation and turn
instead to ethics to ascertain guidelines for conducting their
business?
This same problem worries at least some governments of
capital-exporting countries, which are troubled by the idea that
their nationals operating in emerging economies may be deviating
widely from what are regarded as responsible business practices.
One recent response to this issue was the promulgation of the
1995 Model Business Practices by the Clinton Administration.
The Model Business Practices are not law, but amount to
hortatory injunctions for conducting business abroad according to
certain consistent standards. Are such non-binding standards
helpful, or should there be more legal initiatives such as the 1977
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), which extended
U.S. domestic law to the operations of U.S. businesses abroad?
The unilateral aspect of the FCPA seems to have placed U.S. firms
at a competitive disadvantage without stopping the practice of
bribery in emerging economies. Is the lesson ultimately that all
capital-exporting countries must collaborate to work out a
multilateral framework that will require all of their nationals to
follow consistent standards in their overseas operations?
If one shifts from a legal to an ethical focus, can the history of
the FCPA teach lessons about the merits of trying extraterritorial
extensions of morality? There is much in the background of the
FCPA suggesting that a moral impulse lies behind it. Indeed, the
statutory language itself indicates that it is meant to punish
conduct that is wrongful and corrupt. The original U.S. pro-
nouncements hailing this statute and urging the rest of the capital-
exporting countries to follow suit had little practical impact for
two decades. Looking at the failure of the FCPA to inspire
emulation, one could speculate that a moralistic, value-laden
approach to regulating international business in emerging
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economies cannot be readily assimilated. A sharply contrasting
approach has been adopted by Transparency International ("TI"),
an international non-governmental organization ("NGO") with
chapters in countries around the world, including emerging
economies, that was set up to fight corruption in emerging
economies. The founders of TI regarded the FCPA as a manifes-
tation of a puritanical moral strain in U.S. culture, one not
susceptible of successful transfer to other countries. TI has quite
deliberately elected to steer away from moralism and instead to
emphasize the harmful practical consequences of tolerating corrupt
payments both for international business and emerging economies.
For the former, these corrupt payments mean severe distortions
of competition and interference with the free market, and, for the
latter, these payments can mean grievous setbacks to economic
development and may also set in motion the processes that
convert governments into destructive kleptocracies. It seems that
TI's calculated avoidance of moralistic discourse has facilitated the
acceptance of the TI program in emerging economies, where
grassroots chapters have sprung up. Indeed, the United States has
indirectly paid tribute to the validity of the TI approach by
insisting in its most recent denunciations of the failure to
criminalize foreign corrupt payments that such payments distort
the free market and harm the development of poorer countries.
In recent years, TI has been able to celebrate the production of a
Latin American anti-bribery convention and the 1997 launching
by the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") of a new initiative designed to stop
foreign bribes by OECD nationals. Perhaps these measures will
signal the onset of other multilateral and regional initiatives to
deter international business from engaging in practices in emerging
economies that would expose them to criminal and/or civil
liabilities in their home markets. That is, it seems now that at
least a tentative consensus is emerging to the effect that bans on
bribery should be universally applied, regardless of whether bribes
are tolerated by officials in emerging economies.
Can international law provide a substitute for national
legislation regulating international business in emerging econo-
mies? In 1977, the United Nations ("U.N.") produced a so-called
"code" for transnational corporations, but this never developed
into a formal treaty. A highly politicized document, this "code"
was informed by the Third Worldism then prevailing in the U.N.,
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which treated international businesses as predatory exploiters that
had to be curbed in the interests of protecting the autonomy of
Third World countries. The authors of this "code" did not
conceive of the possibility that international businesses could or
should be encouraged to adhere to a higher standard of conduct
in their international operations than that required under the laws
of host countries in the Third World.
Today, perspectives have changed and, in some cases, changed
to such an extent that converting international businesses into
responsible global citizens may be regarded as offering brighter
prospects for success than trying to curb the exploitative tenden-
cies of entrenched ruling elites in the Global South. Human
rights activists and others concerned with the welfare of emerging
economies are insisting on the adoption of universal standards -
often over the protests of governments of emerging economies.
Believing that private investors are such a powerful force in
shaping economic development that they must be ranked with
governments as subjects of international law, they see a role for
these investors in securing the universal observance of human
rights principles. Perhaps human rights law constitutes one
foundation for a new global ethic that binds all actors, including
international businesses. One has to recognize, however, that
businesspersons are not likely to be human rights specialists and
that their training does not leave them especially well qualified to
analyze human rights problems. How are they to be educated in
the relevant principles?
International human rights law already accepts the notion that
the nation-state is not the final arbiter of right and wrong in its
territory and that sovereignty should constitute no barrier to
criticizing a state's treatment of persons on its territory where
such treatment violates international law. Under this logic, if
employing child labor violates international human rights law,
international businesses should consider themselves bound not to
violate this precept, even when operating in a milieu where the
government has enacted no laws, or no effective laws, prohibiting
the employment of children. If international labor standards
require allowing employees the right to form associations and to
bargain collectively, international businesses should respect this
right, even if they are operating in a country where no law
requires them to respect labor rights. If international law requires
avoiding operations that will devastate the environment, interna-
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tional businesses should adhere to standards that will protect the
environment even in a setting where the host government allows
or even encourages practices that seriously degrade the environ-
ment.
In some cases, international businesses have adopted a
proactive stance, taking steps to work out internal corporate
guidelines to ensure that they act responsibly in emerging
economies. Recognizing the perils of operating in what amount
to legal and ethical black holes when they move overseas, some
U.S. companies engaged in international business have already
moved to create their own "law" by establishing codes of conduct
for their international operations. These codes, however, are not
simple duplicates of domestic laws, being more closely tied to
individual corporate understandings of morality and responsibility.
Therefore, they may vary considerably and may be far from
embodying the full range of principles that would be worked out
by policy makers concerned with optimally regulating businesses
in emerging economies.
Not surprisingly, pursuant to such codes, several major
companies have elected not to conduct business in Burma or even
to withdraw from engagements there, where investment entails
collaborating with a particularly brutal and grasping military
clique, the State Law and Order Restoration Council ("SLORC").
Many decisions in international business, however, are not as
simple as refusing to be associated with Burma's SLORC. For
example, the following questions arise: What about employing
impoverished children in a situation where, without the chance to
earn a salary, these same children may be even hungrier and more
desperate? What if the employment does not prevent the children
from going to school, because they are, in any case, too poor to
afford the fees that must be paid in order to attend the local
schools? Where does the well-intentioned executive look to find
authoritative guidance in such matters? Is it fair or realistic to
expect international businesses to resolve such conundrums? If
not, who or what will offer viable solutions?
If, as part of an investment decision, businesses from the First
World try to scrutinize whether the government of an emerging
economy is representative or oppressive and how bad its human
rights record is, they will open themselves to accusations from
officials to the effect that they are imperialistic and are affronting
national sovereignty. Businesses may consequently shy away from
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such scrutiny, but a failure to make basic inquiries about the
human rights record of the local government may lead them to
stumble into ethical quagmires. One could speculate that a failure
to appraise critically the Nigerian political scene is what led to
Shell's Nigerian debacle. Shell apparently failed to scrutinize the
degree to which the Nigerian regime could speak for the Nigerian
populace before making its fateful deal to develop the oil resources
of the impoverished and neglected Ogoniland region.
On its face, Shell's Nigerian deal was perfectly legal. It
entailed collaboration, however, with a despotic kleptocracy that
had thwarted the democratically expressed will of the Nigerian
citizenry. General Abacha's military regime enjoyed the trappings
of power but lacked the legitimacy of the elected regime that it
had ruthlessly terminated. Naturally, the oppressed Ogoni people
protested oil extraction that degraded their environment but
offered them no benefit. The prominent Ogoni writer and rights
activist Ken Saro Wiwa was one of the leaders of the protests
against Shell's operations, Shell being regarded as a partner of the
despised Abacha. And, not surprisingly, when the Abacha regime
arranged for the judicial murder of Ken Saro Wiwa, thereby
provoking an international outcry, Shell emerged from the
situation with a severely tarnished corporate image. Not only was
Shell seen to be guilty of taking advantage of the relative helpless-
ness of the Ogoni people and contaminating their homeland, but
it was held to share some of the blame for the execution of an
eminent man of letters. Shell's subsequent announcement that it
would make a practice of consulting environmental and human
rights groups for guidance in its overseas operations may be an
attempt at damage control. The announcement, however, could
also represent a recognition that in today's global village, compa-
nies increasingly will be accountable for deviating from an
emerging consensus on international standards for corporate
conduct. This view suggests that businesses must show sensitivity
to human rights issues.
One wonders if Shell executives were not among the many
who have fallen for the myth that everything in a foreign culture
that seems exotic should be subsumed under the rubric "culture."
Westerners seem all too ready to ascribe to "culture" an undemo-
cratic government, brutal working conditions at low pay, official
corruption, gender and race discrimination, and low standards of
environmental protection. When international business executives
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try to justify their acquiescence in such conditions by asserting
that they are obliged to show respect for the local culture, they
may hope to obscure the ethical dilemmas that are raised by their
engagement. Arguments based on the need to accommodate
cultural diversity, however, cannot relieve international business
of the responsibility to make independent, informed judgments
about the ethical implications of proposed courses of action.
"Cultural" arguments have all too often been a pretext for
taking advantage of a situation stacked in favor of an alliance of
foreign capital and an exploitative native elite. Therefore, one of
the important questions to ask when using respect for local
culture to rationalize tolerance for environmental degradation,
governmental oppression, corruption, discrimination, exploitation,
and other ills is whether the people who lose when these ills are
tolerated or exacerbated accept their situation as being "culturally"
mandated. The Nigerian case illustrates how deferring to the
mandate of a foreign state in the guise of respecting a local
"culture," rather than considering the welfare of the affected
population can lead business into conduct that borders on
criminality. If Shell executives had consulted ordinary Nigerians
about their views regarding the abuses and grotesque malfeasance
perpetrated by their military masters, they might have heard
scathing denunciations such as the ones made by a courageous
Nigerian TI activist who spoke fervently on behalf of a universal
standard of corporate responsibility at our May 1997 conference.
(If I do not record the activist's name here, it is because the
Abacha regime has not hesitated to kill, jail, and torture its critics
and even the relatives of such critics.) If Shell executives had
inquired about how the Ogoni people felt about the oil exploita-
tion on their land, they would have learned about the stark
regional cleavages and disputes dividing the different peoples
inhabiting Nigeria and how helpless and disadvantaged the Ogoni
people were. Shell could have ascertained that there was no such
thing as a unitary Nigerian "cultural" consensus that Shell could
rely to legitimate its investment and its collaboration with
Nigeria's thuggish leadership. With some investment in learning
about recent developments in Nigeria, Shell could have appreciat-
ed that, in pursuing oil extraction in Ogoniland, it would be in
effect taking one side in a bitter domestic power struggle, siding
with the forces that were against democracy, against accountable
and transparent government, against fair treatment for minorities,
[Vol. 18:41162
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss4/1
1997] INTRODUCTION 1163
and against equitable distribution of national resources. That the
democratically elected head of government had been summarily
thrown into jail after Abacha's coup and that massive corruption
permeated all levels of the governmental infrastructure were the
kinds of obvious signs of a rotting political structure that should
have prompted a critical inquiry.
Both law and ethics can potentially provide tools for guiding
economic development in countries currently seeking to negotiate
difficult transitions. In some areas, local particularisms may need
to be taken into account, but in others, the players need to adopt
more universal standards. The time is ripe for further examina-
tion of what the international community, capital-exporting
nations, emerging economies, and international business can and
should be undertaking to address the problems of laying the legal
and ethical foundations for economic development in emerging
economies. With our conference and with these papers, we hope.
to encourage further discussion about how these efforts can be
coordinated with a view to enhancing such development in the
interests of all concerned.
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